Is it too late to stop a no deal Brexit?
It has been suggested Boris Johnson could bypass Parliament’s opposition to a no deal Brexit by timing a general election so Parliament was not sitting over the 31 October deadline. David Howarth explains what procedures could be used to avoid this, if politicians are determined to stop no deal.
Picture: Adi Ulici/Unsplash
According to the Sunday Telegraph of 2 August, the Prime Minister’s special adviser Dominic Cummings has declared that ‘MPs are too late to prevent a no-deal Brexit’. This is because even if the House of Commons passes a vote of no confidence in Boris Johnson’s government in early September, ‘we’ll call an election for after the 31st [October – the current exit day in both EU and UK law] and leave anyway’. Is this correct? The answer is, technically, ‘no’, although whether MPs have the political will to take the necessary steps to stop it is a different question.
The Sunday Telegraph’s argument depends on the terms of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, which removes the Prime Minister’s power to call an early general election through asking the Queen to dissolve parliament and replaces it with a power for the House of Commons itself to call for an election, either by a two-thirds majority or by a motion of no confidence in the government which is not followed within 14 days by a vote of confidence in the same or a different government.
Section 2(7) of the 2011 Act does indeed provide that ‘the polling day for the election [called for by the Commons by either route] is to be the day appointed by Her Majesty by proclamation on the recommendation of the Prime Minister’. On the face of things, the Sunday Telegraph is right. Any election following a vote of no confidence could be scheduled for after the UK’s current exit date and so could not prevent a no deal Brexit.
But the Sunday Telegraph is missing four vital points. First, the Prime Minister who decides the date might not be Boris Johnson. Secondly, a new Prime Minister might win a no confidence vote thus averting any election. Thirdly, Parliament might pass an Act amending section 2(7). And fourthly the Prime Minister is subject to judicial review in exercising the section 2(7) power.
The first point is fundamental. The UK Prime Minister is not elected, either by the electorate or by Parliament. The Prime Minister is appointed by the Queen. The Queen by convention appoints someone believed to be able to command the confidence of the House of Commons, but that person does not need to win a vote in the Commons before being appointed and even if that person subsequently loses a vote of confidence, he or she remains Prime Minister until either resignation or dismissal. As a result, it is perfectly possible for someone other than Boris Johnson to be Prime Minister at the end of the 14 days and for that person to choose an earlier date for the election.
How might someone else be appointed Prime Minister? We can discount the standard method that the existing Prime Minister resigns and in doing so advises the Queen to appoint a specific person as successor, since the whole scenario assumes that Boris Johnson is aiming to be Prime Minister at the end of the 14 days. The situation would be that Johnson, having lost the confidence of the House, simply squats at Number 10. Can anything be done to dislodge him? The answer is technically yes. The Queen can dismiss him. Admittedly no monarch has exercised this power since 1834, and it was a bit of a disaster then, and the Queen would almost certainly not exercise it if there was any chance that an incoming Prime Minister would fail to command the confidence of the House.
Some will argue that the Queen should do nothing even if an alternative majority exists since the most democratic way out of the dilemma is to let the electorate decide the issue. But this line of argument faces two big objections. First, ruling out a new government frustrates the intention of the 2011 Act, which allows for that possibility. Secondly, the issue for the electorate to decide is above all Brexit and if Johnson intends, as we now know, to time the election so that the electorate cannot decide Brexit, the democratic argument for doing nothing falls away. Johnson, a Prime Minister lacking the confidence of the House, would have decided, not the people. The Queen might agree to do nothing if Johnson agrees to hold the election at the earliest possible date, but that would also foil the plan.
The issue therefore becomes how to give sufficient reassurance that an incoming Prime Minister would command a majority. The most straightforward way would be a resolution of the Commons recommending a specific person. Admittedly, the government normally controls the agenda of the House of Commons, and so it would be difficult to arrange for a vote, but a method, previously unrecognised, seems to exist in the shape of Standing Order 24.
Standing Order 24 allows the Speaker, on application from an MP, to insert an emergency debate into the order paper. It used to be thought that the motion for such a debate could only be a bland one that the House had ‘considered’ something and that a motion so ‘expressed in neutral terms’ could not be amended. But the new edition of Erskine May, the bible of parliamentary procedure edited by the Speaker’s senior advisers, reveals that the previous understanding is incorrect. The motion does not have to be in neutral form and if it is not in neutral form, it can be amended. Erskine May helpfully gives as an example of a motion not expressed in neutral terms an SO 24 motion moved by the opposition on 11 December 2018. It merely said, ‘That this House has considered the Prime Minister’s unprecedented decision not to proceed with the final two days of debate and the meaningful vote, despite the House’s Order of Tuesday 4 December 2018, and her failure to allow this House to express its view on the Government’s deal or her proposed negotiating objectives, without the agreement of this House.’
On the basis of the new interpretation of SO 24, it should be possible to move an emergency motion that could be amended to include a recommendation about who should become Prime Minister or to suspend the rule that grants the government control of the agenda and set aside time for such a debate and vote.
Even if the government manages to keep control of the agenda, it might still be possible for MPs to indicate that a majority exists for someone else to become Prime Minister. For example, they could sign a collective letter or, which amounts to the same thing, sign a Commons Early Day Motion (one which, contrary to its name, is not debated, but of which the supporters are recorded and counted).
As a result, the Queen might install a new Prime Minister. That Prime Minister might decide not to ask the Commons for its confidence and so allow the 2011 Act to run its course. If so, the new Prime Minister, not Johnson, would choose the date. Alternatively, the new Prime Minister could put down and win a motion of confidence, so that no election would take place. Even if the new Prime Minister lost the confidence vote, he or she would still set the date.
The third point, that Parliament could amend the 2011 Act, is another possible use of the SO 24 procedure. The Commons might seize control of the agenda to pass emergency legislation, as happened with the Letwin-Cooper Bill earlier this year. That bill could, for example, change the law to require the Prime Minister to choose the earliest possible date for a general election. It could also make a no deal exit less likely by requiring the Prime Minister to ask for an extension of exit day and to accept any extension offered by the EU27, or even require a revocation of the Article 50 notice if the EU27 refused to offer an extension.
The fourth point, litigation, is probably the weakest, since judges would be very reluctant to interfere, but. in principle, statutory powers, including s. 2(7), may only be used for a proper purpose and after considering only relevant considerations, and so a court might decide that delaying the election solely to make it politically meaningless was improper and thus illegal.
Of course, the first two methods only work if MPs can agree on a new Prime Minister. Politically that might be difficult. Jeremy Corbyn is unlikely to command wide enough support but choosing someone else – some have mentioned Hilary Benn or Yvette Cooper, but others are possible, including Ken Clarke and Caroline Lucas – requires the current party system to be dismantled. The third method, the Act of Parliament, is politically less disruptive but runs its own risks. It needs a solid majority, which might not exist for every proposition, and it requires the House of Lords to be treated with unaccustomed procedural brutality.
A no deal Brexit can still be stopped, but only at a price.
This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of Democratic Audit.
About the author
David Howarth is Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of Cambridge.
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No mention of democracy or the fact that Parliament created acts to leave the EU. Presumably, we have to repeal all the other acts if we create a new one overriding those.
I thought Article 50 had been illegally amended to allow further extensions ad finitum. Does nobody care about that?
All this talk of legal and parliamentary niceties is redolent of Jardine v. Jardine, in Bleak House. If Boris loses a no confidence vote, and again 14 days later, the Queen will be expected to look for another PM around whom enough recalcitrant MPs can coalesce. The chance of finding someone who ‘fits the bill’ is as likely as finding life on Mars, especially as Corbyn won’t corral his troops under anyone other than himself. And anyway most Tory europhiles will balk at ‘putting the boot in’ to Boris, now that they are going up in the polls. No, Boris will call another election after the 14 days is up, for Nov 7, the Queen will comply and the necessary Crown Proclamation will be issued. It’s called politics!
Is a no confidence motion itself amendable? If so then a further possibility is that the House of Commons passes a motion that simultaneously declares no confidence in the current government and also expresses confidence in an alternative one; or which expresses no confidence and sets aside parliamentary time to debate legislation to extend Article 50 during the 14-day period.
Thanks for a very interesting article, Professor Howarth.
I read a comment on an article in The Times that suggested that the Queen, while perhaps not wanting to remove Mr Johnson, would be “obliged” to do so, should someone else be able to command the confidence of the House of Commons. Since much has been written about her sense of duty, I suspect she would act as she felt she was obliged to.
While I think this is beyond the scope of your article, I do wonder how flexible Labour will be in supporting a neutral choice for replacement PM? Might they cynically want to see a no-deal exit if they think it gives them a better chance of forming the next government? (Of course, that would perhaps be no more cynical than Mr Cameron’s decision to call a referendum in the first place.)
The Queen would certainly remove Mr Johnson if another government won a confidence vote. But there can’t be another govt until Mr Johnson goes. I suppose the House could resolve ‘we would vote confidence in a government headed by X (even though we don’t know who else would be in it) in the hypothetical event of one being formed’ but this would surely not be binding on either the existing PM or the monarch.
I have indicated what convention requires.
Johnson and his government must resign, or be dismissed.
Corbyn must be invited, but can demur.
Johnson could be reappointed in that case, or some national unity ministry perhaps.
There has never been a requirement for any government to first demonstrate they have the confidence of the House, although it would be an unwise leader who accepted HMQ’s commission, knowing he was certain to fail….
The situation you describe has changed since the 2011 FTPA. We may all think the architects of that act have left us with a constitutional mess that risks dragging the Queen into politics but we cannot pretend the conventions are the same when the act says otherwise.
https://www.conservativehome.com/thetorydiary/2019/08/osborne-brexits-saviour.html
Heretofore, a PM who led a government which had lost the confidence of the House, either
a) resigned immediately, the government going out of office, or
b) requested a dissolution, with the proviso that the Monarch was not bound to grant it. A refusal of course would be de facto the dismissal of the government (such a scenario was last considered in 1924, and George V only granted Macdonald a dissolution after ascertaining there was no alternative viable government possible from the current House)
and
c) in the event of a government surrendering the seals of office, the Leader of Her/His Majesty’s Opposition would be invited to form a government (however small their strength in the House). They could decline (as in 1873 and 1851), or accept (as in January 1924 and 1905)
The FTPA only affects b) in removing the Monarch’s prerogative power to grant an early dissolution.
The remaining conventions are intact.
For any government (Johnson in this case) to refuse to resign after losing a vote of confidence, either under the statutory FTPA – or under any ‘plain’ VoNC – would be an constitutional outrage, and would strike at the heart of our entire system of democracy. The Queen in that case would be the last defence against such abuse, and would be required to dismiss Johnson.
On the other hand, Corbyn might not be able or willing to form a government, and could decline the commission (as Disraeli did in 1873).
In which case Johnson could find himself soon re-appointed!
Our constitution is flexible, but the niceties must still be observed…
But the fixed-term parliament act has replaced the conventions with law. What the convention was before the FTPA codified the procedure is irrelevant — the idea of the Queen claiming otherwise & firing Boris on the spot is about as likely as Dennis Skinner being the next PM.
It has not. It has simply avoided the issue, quite correctly, precisely because it did not disturb – nor want to disturb, nor want to be seen to disturb – those very conventions!
Think about what you are saying. The confidence of the House of Commons in the Executive is the very keystone of our democracy.
The fact that the FTPA did not specify exactly what happens in the case of a VoNC does NOT mean that NOTHING will happen!
The Conventions are still “live” and are part of our Constitution.
The alternative view is that the FTPA somehow “abolished” the concept of Confidence altogether…, viz
Lose a FTPA VoNC: no worries, sit tight
Lose a second FTPA VoNC 14 days later: no worries, sit tight…
and sail into a General Election as the sitting PM…
If not history, then commonsense should tell you that the alternative view must be WRONG…
Old: if you lose a VONC you must either resign or call an election
New: If you lose a VONC you must either resign or face a second vote. If you lose that, you must call an election.
You can argue about which was preferable but neither is constitutionally wrong.
There is no prospect for the Queen dismissing Boris if he fails to resign after losing a no-confidence vote, for the simple reason that the fixed-term parliament act nowhere says that he has to.
You are quite simply 100% wrong…
file:///home/rod/Downloads/SN02873.pdf
[Democratic Audit Editor: I think you intended this link: https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN02873 ]
yes, and I urge everyone to read the full report (pdf) , not just the briefing…
“The fact that the government of the day must retain the confidence of the House of Commons is the constitutional principle which determines the relationship between Parliament and Government. The Government’s authority to govern is dependent on maintaining the confidence of the House of Commons. This principle remains fundamental to our system of Parliamentary democracy.”
“The ability of a government to command the confidence of the elected House of Commons is central to its authority to govern. It is tested by votes on motions of confidence, or no confidence.”
“The aim of the Bill is not otherwise to interfere with the conventions which govern the position where the Government loses the confidence of the House”
“..it is on the ability to command a majority in the Commons that a government depends for holding office.”
“.. the government of the day may continue in office for only as long as it continues to enjoy majority support in the House of Commons. The moment such support is withdrawn is the very moment that the government is required to resign.”
“..If the House of Commons resolves, by whatever means, that it has
no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government, this removes the
incumbent administration’s authority to govern… Any expression of no confidence by the House in the government, removes the authority to govern.”
doesn’t make sense to say the conventions are unaltered. The FTP bill has already removed the convention that the govt can call an election after a first VONC as an alternative to resigning. Furthermore when the FTP act went through in 2011, an amendment was put to the effect that the govt must resign as soon as it loses the 1st vote, and was defeated.
It makes sense to the House of Commons library, and all the authoritative sources quoted in its Briefing Paper (March 2019).
I rest my case…
Dominic Cummings has always been dismissive of most Conservative MPs, and his disrespect for former cabinet ministers like Philip Hammond combined with the way he expects current cabinet ministers to regurgitate meaningless phrases he has written for them (“undemocratic backstop” etc) is upsetting a number of Tories who were already wondering if a party led by Mr Johnson is the place they belong.
This makes it more likely that Mr Johnson will lose the vote of no confidence which Mr Corbyn will have no option but to table.
That will not be enough, ‘rebel’ Conservative MPs and opposition parties will have to have agreed on an alternative PM in whom they do have confidence, and who can be voted in to lead an interim government of national unity.
Clearly that could not be Mr Corbyn himself, for even quite a few of his own MPs would not have confidence in him as PM. But neither could it be another Labour MP, for that would undermine Mr Corbyn’s position as potential PM after the election.
In order to maximise the Conservative vote it would have to be a Conservative MP with the right authority who is trusted and respected on all sides of the House, but who clearly has no long term ambitions of his own. Fortunately there is one obvious candidate who meets all the criteria and might be prepared to take on this poisoned chalice, to make the necessary arrangements as interim PM before an election could be called.
Mr Johnson might refuse to resign but enough of his own MPs would then switch their support to avoid a constitutional crisis, and Mr Johnson would be forced out by weight of numbers.
A Prime Minister appointed by the remain faction sitting in the House of Commons in an attempt not only to frustrate the result of the 2016 referendum but also the last general election where over eighty percent of the electorate voted for parties which expressly supported Brexit.
Just step back and think about the consequences of such an action. Even if you can find enough remainers in the House of Commons to go along with such a desperate and quasi dictatorial scheme, how do you think the electorate would feel about such a plan being carried out? Johnson being elected leader of the Conservatives and thus becoming PM is about as far as our – very elastic and flexible constitution will go – but this technocratic plan will do infinitely more damage to our Parliament than Guido Fawkes and his kegs of gunpowder.
Personally speaking I would be shocked if any MPs would consider such an action. If the course of events you write about came to pass I would then be appalled and extremely angry and I am an ordinary, small ‘c’ (insert your favourite profanity here) taxpaying, conservative who favours a small laissez faire government. The electors tolerates and accepts many things from our politicians, the corruption, the laziness, the high handed arrogance, the ineptitude masquerading as firm governance, the bloated expenses, the never ending pomposity, the unbelievable waste and the bonus of an occasional hard working and honest MP, though what you describe above is wholly unacceptable if it is attempted and will probably destroy our democracy. I sincerely hope that one wants that.
I think your opening sentence should read “A Prime Minister appointed by MPs opposed to a no-deal Brexit following a referendum in which the Leave campaign promised a deal with the EU and an election in which over eighty percent of the electorate voted for parties which expressly supported leaving with a deal”.
How does the rest of your post look in the light of that correction?
So what if Johnson/Cummings surprise us all and call a re-run of the referendum if a confidence vote is lost instead of an election? Who would object to that? They could take the gamble that a well organised and prepared ‘leave’ campaign buoyed by Farage could win against a collection of disorganised remain parties and Corbyn, who dithers again. A second referendum win, followed by a no deal Brexit and then an election – where Johnson is not challenged by the Brexit Party or the Lib Dems – and all he has to do is run rings round Corbyn and he gets a ‘clean’ five years?
As a complete layperson (as far as the law is concerned) I have a question: what would happen in the scenario outlined here if Boris, instead of barricading the door and squatting at Number 10, resigned immediately and recommended to HM the Queen that she appoint, let’s say, Steve Baker as the new PM? Would Steve Baker then get to set the date of the election?
HMQ does not have to accept the advice of a PM who has lost a vote of confidence. Indeed if she doesn’t ask for advice, the outgoing PM cannot give any. So I suspect it wouldn’t make any difference. The question for HMQ is whether the person proposed has a reasonable prospect of commanding the confidence of the House. Could the Cabinet Secretary and the Private Secretary to the Queen honestly say that Mr Baker, or, say, Mr Farage, was likely to command the confidence of the House?
I should add that if this did happen, Mr Baker would immediately be no confidenced. I don’t think that re-starts the clock but it would embarrass the Queen and ensure that when Mr Baker arrived at the Palace to resign and perhaps suggest some other implausible candidate, HMQ would not ask him for advice.
Many thanks for replying. Undoubtedly you know know far more than I do about these constitutional matters, but I can’t help wondering whether it is very likely that the Queen would want to become embroiled in this situation to begin with? We are entering into uncharted territory, I suppose…
” The question for HMQ is whether the person proposed has a reasonable prospect of commanding the confidence of the House.”
Is that the question, or is the question implied by the Fixed Term Parliament Act that the person has a reasonable prospect of commanding a working majority for the remainder of the parliament. Since that is the intent of the legislation.
Which would then preclude the games to install temporary Prime Ministers to try and prevent Brexit happening.
If I was Johnson I would put that argument forward – that there is nobody who can command a majority in this parliament for its intended duration, therefore it should be ended now if they will not back me.
Similarly the argument that the electorate should decide Brexit is moot.
The electorate voted in the last General Election to deliver Brexit and this parliament has via its votes delivered the Withdrawal Act and nothing else positive. Therefore it should be implemented. Parliament has had its say numerous times. Now surely it is time for government to get its way. As is the convention.
Is there one more possibility – of a “standard” no-confidence motion, put forward by the leader of the Opposition (which therefore must be debated), but which does not fall within the scope of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act? Such a motion – crucially – need not lead to an election, yet could achieve the desired objective of dislodging the sitting PM? Grateful for your thoughts on this one…
Yes that is possible, again using SO24. My guess is that Boris Johnson would refuse to accept it and sit tight, and so the same issues arise about how to convince HMQ to dismiss and replace him. The difference would be that no 14 day time limit would apply and no election would loom.
Thanks for the reply. In that scenario, it would be truly fascinating to see what happened next! I read somewhere that HMQ would do just about anything to avoid getting dragged into politics – especially on an issue which so divides her subjects. In which case, however much the wailing and gnashing of teeth in parliament, the media and the country, not much would happen until the clock ticked past 11pm on All Hallows Eve… But I hope not!
Do you know why the Government voted against its own SO24 motion in the example given above? Interesting if that is the only SO24 debate not in neutral terms.
Also – does it definitely follow that a non neutral motion would be amendable? It doesn’t seem as if the above motion was amendable?
Thanks
*sorry why the opposition voted against its own SO24 motion?
The reason seemed to have been that voting ‘no’ looked like the way to show disapproval.
On amendability, the whole point of the Erskine May footnote (para 19.22, footnote 20, for those who want to see it for themselves) is that the December 2018 motion was amendable. It was just that no one seemed to realise that at the time.
this article relies on an ambiguity in the FTPA leading to a widely held assumption that it permits a new coalition to seize the reins of power potentially allowing the opposition to cross the floor. There are two problems with this. Firstly only someone already appointed PM can move the 14th day vote of confidence – the FTPA VOC is in the terms “That this House has confidence in Her Majesty’s Government”.
A VOC in a person SEEKING to become PM isn’t the same thing. An “alternative” Government ie a coalition, must be led by the existing PM or their nominee already appointed as a new PM by HM. The opposition cannot cross the floor to even move the FTPA confidence motion as they do not have a PM and are not a Government.
The purpose of the Act is to maintain the 5 year election cycle not to allow a bunch of chancers to seize control for a few months in an inherently unstable junta simply to postpone an inevitable early election changing the election cycle. . Not a potential pretender.
Secondly and perhaps more fundamentally the ambiguity is resolved by looking at Hansard. As the FTPA proceeded through both Houses the common assumption was that it merely allowed the PM who has lost the VONC to regain it. The clearest exposition of this is from Lord Richard 1st March 2011 Column 936: Although he was opposing the Bill Lord Richard said this “Why on earth should a Government who have lost the confidence of the House of Commons be given, in effect, a second chance to cobble together another coalition that might have the confidence of the House of the Commons?” On that correct interpretation of the Act all the conjecture about Magic Grandpa seizing power is nonsense.
This is incorrect. The Government’s Explanatory Notes on the Bill are very clear. “The intention is to provide an opportunity for an alternative Government to be formed without an election.” That is far more significant than a speech by an opponent of the Bill.
Interestingly, the Explanatory Notes do not mention the possibility of the defeated Prime Minister having another go. That possibility seems only to have been raised during the debates,
The article makes clear that the appointment of a new PM comes first. On appointment, the new PM gains control over the order paper and so can move the statutory motion of confidence.
Any resolutions of the House before the appointment of a new PM, for example resolutions declaring that the House supports the appointment of a specific person, would not count as a statutory vote of confidence. They would only be expressions of opinion designed to reassure the Queen that if that person were appointed, he or she would be likely to command the confidence of the House.
so it all depends on your interpretation of “alternative” and you still have to break a lot of Constitutional conventions to actively involve HM in politics. None of which seem to be justified by the simple words pf a very short Act and none of which seem to have been aired before certainly not during the debates.
furthermore an “Explanatory Note” is not part of an Act of Parliament and nothing in it can be used to interpret the words used within the Act itself. The note was not part of the Bill which might explain why your interpretation based on that note never featured in those debates. In contrast how the Bill was considered in debates can be used in Court as an aid to interpretation of the actual words in the Act.
If there is a vote of no confidence and Boris loses then who is technically in charge during that 14 days? Is is not possible for parliament to pass a motion to revoke A50?
the only lacuna in power is in the few MINUTES between one PM resigning before HM and the new PM being invited to form a Government. A PM who has lost a VONC or even a General Election remains PM until that audience.
With the greatest respect to Prof Howarth I think he’s got a bit carried away here. None of those scenarios are even remotely likely even if they’re technically possible. An analysis grounded in reality would be preferable.
This is a very interesting story about what could happen to BJ around Halloween, but apart from someone revoking A50 before October 31st, what sort of miracle could prevent the UK from crashing out of the EU??? It certainly won’t be, at this stage, any sort of debate in the HoC…
Would a fourth vote on the May deal work as Stephen Kinnock appears to imply?
Nicely technical but it seems unrealistic. If after a vote of no confidence an election date is set by the incumbent, BJ, for after Halloween then there is no way any other prime minister will just be appointed by the Queen on a vote of the House, since a general election process would already have started. She knows that’s how you vote for a change of PM, against the will of the ruling party, in this country. Anyway there is no other candidate who could obviously secure the confidence of the house. All BJ has to do then to avoid Parliamentary attempts to avoid no deal is sit on his hands, regardless of what votes they pass, if they can. He’ll already have called an election. Why should the Queen intervene? After all, it seems to be forgotten that the people and subsequently the House voted to leave and enabled the legislation.
To be clear, the PM’s power to set the date of the election only arises after the 14 days. It does not arise immediately after the vote of no confidence. So what you are suggesting in the first part of your comment cannot happen.
Maybe there is no other candidate who could ‘obviously’ secure the confidence of the house, (any of the 4 mentioned would be ok with me), but exceptional times call for exceptional measures, and if in the national interest needs must so I would have thought they will find a way to agree one who can immediately request an extension and then call for a people’s vote or an election.
Realistically the only MP who is independent enough and ideologically positioned enough to unite both the left-wing Labour MPs loyal to Corbyn and rest of the No Deal opposition (including Tories, Lib Dems and nationalists), is Lucas.
I can’t imagine the likes of Clive Lewis or Lloyd Russell-Moyle ever having confidence in someone like Ken Clarke or Jo Swinson, or even a moderate Labour MP effectively standing against Corbyn.
The people have voted. The remainers should stop being undemocratic they’re remainer dictatorship is destroying the peoples trust in parliament and democracy, why vote if it can be ignored and things can only pass if the remainer like it…
The remainers are not being undemocratic. Firstly no government should knowingly push the country into economic peril as Johnson is attempting to do.
Secondly, the referendum was taken on the grounds that we would be better off outside the EU, with full access to the single market. If we can not be better off with full access to the single market, then the basis on which the leave vote was successful cannot be fulfilled and in such circumstances, revocation is the appropriate action.
Alan White. The economy is not the sole factor in national decisions. If the only goal was to grow the economy then we would have a ultra low tax, ultra low regulation, small government nation that would drop much of the welfare state and the NHS. In actual fact, we decide that some things are important enough to us that we are prepared to exchange some wealth for them.
Many people see leaving the EU as one of these things and that the chance to be free of an undemocratic organisation whose clear goal is ever greater fiscal and political integration is in the long run, worth some economic pain.
As for the your contention about the referendum,it was not “taken on the grounds that we would be better off outside the EU, with full access to the single market”. The question was simple and did not mention anything beyond leaving the EU. In fact, the remain campaign did everything they could to make it clear that voting to leave would, in their view, cause economic disaster from the very day of the vote and that we wouldn’t have access to the single market. They even sent a leaflet to every single UK household to say this very thing. Yet people still voted to leave.
Then, whilst it became clear that leaving was not going to be easy, people voted in a general election where 83% of the turnout voted for Leave parties.
Finally, when it was obvious that even May’s weak deal wasn’t going to work, they voted in EU elections in which a party created solely with the aim of exiting the EU won 2 million more votes than the next largest. A party that came from nowhere and won as many votes as the next 2 parties combined – unheard of in UK politics.
The possibility that leaving the EU may mean leaving the single market and may mean economic pain has been made abundantly clear at all points. And at all possible points, people have still voted to leave the EU in vast numbers. To claim otherwise is disingenous.
“Secondly, the issue for the electorate to decide is above all Brexit” That’s incorrect. Parliament has already decided Brexit – the bill was approved by parliament last year. So assuming Johnson loses a VOC and does not resign and waits 14 days – as he is entitled to – the Queen is unlikely to ask anyone to be Prime Minister, who is not going to pursue what parliament has already decided unless there is a convincing and overwhelming expression in parliament that it wants to revoke Article 50. Further the idea that the Queen is going to get involved with politics by changing Prime Ministers as a result of collective letters etc is rather fanciful.
Correct. This is not solely about the economy, its about control. What is frequently disregarded in this debate is the state of the EU and where the EU is intent on heading.
Remain is not the current EU dipped in cement. Many brexiteers fear where it is heading and further forced loss of UK control.
In addition, ALL the major players on the remain side clearly stated “a vote to leave was a vote to leave the single market and customs union”
That included Cameron, Clegg, Osborne, Farron, Cable and many others on the remain side.
Equally it was spelt out by those same people what the terrible supposed economic consequences would be.
Therefore the mandate remains entirely valid.